We explore the impact of concentration in the banking markets on the capital structure of publicly quoted non-…nancial …rms in the EU15 over the period 1997-2005, an era marked by intensive merger activity in the banking sector. Our main …nding is a negative and signi…cant relationship between the degree of concentration of European bank markets and the market leverage of …rms, indicating the persistence of credit constraints. This …nding is robust when we use behavioral measures of bank conduct. This support for the market power hypothesis indicates that further measures are needed to make bank lending more competitive.
Introduction
The positive role of the banking sector in enhancing economic growth through a more e¢ cient resource allocation has been widely documented (Levine and Zervos (1998) ). Since banks are important suppliers of funds to …rms, the structure of bank markets as well as the e¤ects of market structure changes on the lending behavior of banks may have an impact on the access of …rms to bank …nance. It is, however, unclear how bank market structure changes may a¤ect the access of non-…nancial …rms to bank lending (Black and Strahan (2002) ). More concentrated banking markets have been found to lead to lower growth, except for industries that depend heavily on external …nance (Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)). In this paper we examine empirically whether changes in the structure of European bank markets a¤ect the access of non-…nancial …rms to bank …nance. More speci…cally, we investigate the relationship between the degree of concentration of European bank markets and the capital structure of non-…nancial …rms.
Banks have been and remain the dominant source of debt …nancing for European companies. During the last decade, the European banking sector has been characterized by a wave of mergers and acquisitions, predominantly in the form of domestic consolidation (ECB (2006)). The result has been a substantial increase in the measured level of bank market concentration in most countries. Similarly, European bond and stock markets have witnessed a pronounced development and integration since the introduction of the Euro (Rajan and Zingales (2003) ). These developments in the bank and …nancial markets make the period under consideration, [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , and the geographical scope (EU15) particularly interesting to investigate the impact of the evolving market structure of …nancial intermediaries on external …nancing decisions by non-…nancial …rms.
By investigating the relationship between bank market concentration and …rm leverage this paper relates to the empirical corporate …nance literature (Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Fama and French (2002) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) ). The paper contributes to two strands of this empirical literature.
The …rst is the recent literature which examines how the supply of external …nance a¤ects the corporate …nance behavior of companies (Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , Leary (2005) , Lemmon and Roberts (2007) ). Bank loans play a less important role in the …nancing of large U.S. companies (Danthine et al. (2002) , Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) ), therefore these papers do not investigate bank loan …nancing 1 . We argue that the EU countries are a well suited geographical area to examine the role of bank loan supply because domestic mergers and acquisitions have fundamentally altered the market structure of banking under the period of investigation. This allows us to exploit both time and cross-country variation to examine the role of bank loan …nancing on the capital structure of …rms. Moreover, since the introduction of the Euro, bonds and equity have become more important alternatives for external …nance next to bank loans in the EU. Therefore, we can account for the increasing competition between banks and …nancial markets.
A second line of corporate …nance literature investigates the role of institutions on corporate …nancing choices (Demirgüç-kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Giannetti (2003) , Fan et al. (2006) ). We contribute to this evidence by instrumenting the observed bank market structures using measures of competition policy from Carletti et al. (2008) . Our …nal contribution relates to the literature which examines the role of bank market structure on the external …nance behavior of companies (Petersen and Rajan (1995) , Zarutski (2006) ). First, we examine listed companies instead of small and medium-sized companies.
Second, we use not only the usual concentration measures (HHI, CR5) but also behavioral measures (Lerner index and Boone indicator).
The sample period covers sub-periods characterized by di¤erent business cycle conditions, so that our results are not driven by speci…c macroeconomic conditions. Methodologically, as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , we attempt to integrate demand and supply factors that may a¤ect leverage decisions by non-…nancial corporations. Furthermore, we exploit the panel structure of the data by using a sample of individual …rms across di¤erent years, allowing us to use …rm …xed e¤ects (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006) ).
Our main …nding is a negative and signi…cant relationship between the degree of competition in the European bank markets and the market leverage of …rms, implying that increased concentration of bank markets imposes an external debt …nance constraint on non-…nancial …rms. These …ndings are robust when we use behavioral measures of bank competition, instead of the traditional market structure indicators. Our …ndings strengthen the case for further regulatory action aimed at stimulating competition in European banking markets.
In the next section we state the main hypotheses: the information-based hypothesis and the market power hypothesis. The empirical strategy which integrates the demand and supply factors for corporate leverage is outlined in Section 3. We then present our data on listed non-…nancial …rms, di¤erent bank market structure variables and measures of alternative external …nance (section 4). In section 5 we examine the determinants of leverage and the impact of our measures of market structure. The bank market structure variables are instrumented and we check the robustness of the results. We conclude in Section 6 and present broader implications of our …ndings.
Determinants of corporate leverage: supply and demand factors
This paper examines the e¤ect of bank market concentration on the availability of bank loans to non-…nancial …rms. The literature has identi…ed two alternative hypotheses, the market power hypothesis and the information-based hypothesis. Banks have an informational advantage over public lenders. Higher bank market concentration may make banks more e¢ cient and strengthen this information advantage, thereby inducing banks to invest more in relationships.
This should mitigate the asymmetric information problem which is the main cause for credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ) and therefore lead to more lending and hence, to higher observed levels of corporate leverage. We call this the information-based hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is the market power explanation. Several theories predict a negative e¤ect of bank consolidation on the availability of loans. A non-…nancial company which is confronted with a concentrated banking market may face less attractive loan conditions when banks e¤ectively use their market power. As a result …rms will decrease their use of bank debt and exhibit lower leverage, assuming the absence of alternatives for external debt …nance. We call this the market power hypothesis. Previous empirical studies have reported mixed results.
On the one hand Petersen and Rajan (1994) Most research on the e¤ect of bank concentration on lending originates from the U.S. Moreover, research has concentrated on privately-held …rms, more speci…cally SMEs, both for the U.S. and other countries. There are solid economic reasons to focus on SMEs: they are smaller, they are more opaque and hence characterized by larger informational asymmetry and they are more dependent on bank …nancing for their investment than large public …rms, suggesting that the e¤ects of bank competition should be more pronounced for SMEs (Berger et al. (2005) In our empirical setup we also account for the alternatives to bank loans, 
Empirical strategy
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that information asymmetry and agency problems are the market frictions that make capital structure choices relevant but also imply that …rms are sometimes rationed by their lenders.
Thus, when explaining a …rm's leverage, it is important to include not only the determinants of its preferred leverage (the demand side) but also the variables that measure the constraints on a …rm's ability to increase its leverage (the supply side). Therefore, we follow their empirical strategy, since we focus our analysis on one particular supply side factor, i.e. bank market structure.
To examine the role of credit constraints and help explore the di¤erence between the public debt markets (e.g., bonds) and bank debt, we consider the leverage of …rms to be a function of the concentration in the bank market and alternatives to bank loans such as (the development of) the bond market and the equity market. The observed level of debt is a function of the supply of debt and the …rm's demand for debt, both of which depend on the price of debt capital and supply and demand factors.
If there are no supply frictions, …rms can borrow as much debt as they want (at the correct price), and the observed level of debt will equal the demanded level. This is the traditional assumption in the empirical capital structure literature. Only demand factors explain variation in the …rms' debt levels, where demand factors are any …rm characteristic that raises the net bene…t of debt.
However, if …rms without access to public debt markets are constrained in the amount of debt that they may issue (private lenders do not fully replace the lack of public debt), or when they face concentrated banking markets, they will have lower leverage ratios, even after controlling for the …rm's demand for debt. Equating the demand and supply, we can express the above equations as two reduced form equations -one for quantity and the other for price -so that each is a function of the demand and supply factors.
We use a measure of bank market structure or bank conduct to capture the external …nancing constraints imposed by the access to bank loans. As stated before, theory provides mixed arguments leading to two opposing hypotheses.
On the one hand, higher bank market concentration may lead to more bank …nancing under the information-based hypothesis. On the other hand, concentration may be associated with less bank …nancing when the market power hypothesis holds. We control for two alternatives, bond …nancing and equity issuing. We expect that bond …nancing will be positively linked with leverage since …rms can turn to the …nancial markets if the bond market is well developed. With respect to equity issuing, …rms will be able to issue equity more easily if the stock market is well developed. As a result they will have lower leverage.
The demand factors are captured by the …rm characteristics. Several factors have been found to have a robust correlation with cross-sectional di¤erences in leverage (Frank and Goyal (2005)). Leverage is positively related to tangibility, size and median industry leverage, whereas it is negatively related to growth opportunities and pro…tability. Tangibility captures the presence of …xed assets which are easier to collateralize. Therefore, …rms remain more valuable when they go into distress, hence …rms with a lot of collateralizable assets will …nd it easier to obtain bank loans. Furthermore, the agency costs for …rms with high tangible asset ratios are lower, as collateral makes it more di¢ cult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones. The next factor is size. Large …rms will have more debt since larger …rms are more diversi…ed and have lower default risk. Larger …rms are also typically more mature …rms that have a reputation in debt markets and consequently face lower agency cost of debt. Finally, median industry leverage re ‡ects a number of otherwise omitted common factors and in a trade-o¤ setting, the industry median debt ratio is likely to be a proxy for the target capital structure. The growth opportunities of the …rm are negatively correlated with leverage since growing …rms are assumed to lose more of their value when they go into distress. Furthermore agency costs, which can arise due to underinvestment, asset substitution or free cash ‡ow are mitigated to a large extent in growth …rms. Finally, the negative correlation found for …rm pro…tability is usually ascribed to lower expected bankruptcy costs and more valuable interest tax shields. Firms that generate higher pro…ts relative to investments also bene…t form the discipline that debt provides in mitigating the free cash ‡ow problem (agency cost). In our empirical setup, we include all these 'stylized'demand factors (Rajan and Zingales ( 
Data
The sample of non-…nancial …rms is constructed from Amadeus, a panEuropean …nancial database that provides detailed balance sheet and income data for companies in Europe and standardized balance sheet information with the stated objective of achieving uniformity and enabling cross-border analysis. We select all consolidated 2 listed …rms of the EU15 for the period 2 Except for Greece where no consolidated data is available. We also run the regressions without Greece, the results remain unaltered. (2006)). The dependent variable used in the analysis is market leverage which is constructed as the ratio of debt, both short and long term, over the sum of debt and market value of the …rm (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). We also use book leverage, de…ned as the ratio of debt over total assets, but this leads to similar qualitative results.
The supply side is measered using several indicators of bank concentration and bank conduct at the country level (Table 1. We use private bond market capitalization to GDP, calculated as the ratio of private domestic debt securities as a share of GDP, as a proxy for the development of the bond market, and a measure of stock market development, i.e. the 6 An alternative measure of bank behavior would be the Panzar-Rosse measure.
Bikker and Haaf (2002) calculate this H-statistic for 23 European and non-European countries and …nd support for the conventional view that concentration impairs competition. However, we lack su¢ cient data for this measure to apply it in our panel data framework.
value of listed shares to GDP to proxy for the development of stock markets.
Our …nal measure of access to external …nance is obtained checking …rm by …rm whether they issue bonds using the bond module in Datastream. This provides us with a dummy which has value one starting from the year that the …rm issues a bond. We include this dummy to explicitly account for one particular outside …nancing option using the fact that some …rms e¤ectively use bond …nancing, whereas others do not.
Finally, we include robustness measures (Table 1 Noteworthy for our analysis, the correlations suggest that the country-level variables may potentially in ‡uence the capital structure choice. The correlation of leverage with both concentration measures is negative whereas the measure of private bond market capitization is positive. Stock market capitalization is negatively correlated with market leverage. These raw correlations do not, however, control for other characteristics.
Empirical results
Our base model is: is excluded) to control for serial correlation. Finally, …xed e¤ects at the …rm level also allow controlling for industry and/or country e¤ects. Therefore, the …rm e¤ects will encompass not only …rm-speci…c characteristics but also those regulatory and macroeconomic conditions in the di¤erent countries that do not change over time.
The determinants of leverage Table 6 presents the basic regressions. In the …rst column we explain the variation in the market leverage ratio by only including …rm characteristics in order to capture the demand side of corporate …nancing choices. In the second column we introduce the HHI as a measure of bank market concentration in order to take the supply side of bank loans into account. In the third column we also control for alternative sources of …nance, i.e. the bond and the stock 
Endogeneity
A potential problem associated with using observed changes in bank market structure to explain di¤erences in corporate …nancial structures across countries is that the market structure of the banking sector can itself be in ‡uenced by …rms'…nancing decisions or by the development of other institutions, creating a potential endogeneity problem. While an individual …rm takes the market structure of the banking sector as given, that market structure may be a¤ected by the aggregate decision of all …rms. One plausible explanation could be that companies with higher leverage have higher investment. Hence, these companies will need more external capital, which could trigger the entry of foreign banks in that country, thereby altering the market structure of the banking sector. To address the endogeneity issue we re-estimate the baseline regres-sion using the instrumental variables approach. We follow Fan et al. (2006) and use the size of bank deposits in a country and the amount of non-life insurance premiums as instruments for bank market structure. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) propose the country's level of development and its legal system as instruments. However, since we focus on the EU15, our sample is very homogenous in the level of development and it characterized by strong regulatory convergence. As an alternative, we use a dataset from Carletti, Overall, we can conclude that controlling for endogeneity does not alter the results.
Robustness
We apply a number of checks to assess the robustness of our …ndings. In the …rst three columns of table 8 argue that the broader range of countries in our sample is preferable since the larger cross-country variation in the loan supply variable should allow us to estimate the e¤ect on …rm leverage more precisely. Moreover, we use market leverage to alleviate the problem of accounting di¤erences in book values of assets. In column 6, a dummy variable taking the value one after 1999 is included. Our intention is to take the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the subsequent development and gradual integration of …nancial markets into account. This procedure addresses the concern that there might be a structural break in the sample. We also interact this dummy with the concentration measure. The 'Euro'dummy turns out to be positive and signi…cant indicating that European …rms increased their leverage after 1999. Whether or not this can be fully attributed to the Euro cannot be established from this simple exercise, since it is also possible that business cycle e¤ects or changes in interest rate conditions may have contributed. The interaction term with HHI is insigni…cant, indicating that there is no additional e¤ect on leverage that was not already captured by bank market structure itself. However, the bank market concentration variable remains negative and signi…cant, as in the baseline regressions. In the …nal column of table 8 we include the relative presence of foreign banks to account for the contestability of national bank markets.
As we expect, this measure has a signi…cant positive impact, suggesting that companies …nd it easier to get external …nance in countries where there is more bank entry. However, the e¤ect of contestability does not compensate the e¤ect of bank concentration; on the contrary, the e¤ect of bank market concentration becomes even more pronounced. Table 9 contains a number of additional speci…cations to account for economic or methodological concerns. In the …rst column we include measures The lagged leverage variable is instrumented with lagged book leverage and the …rm characteristics. Although this procedure constitutes only a …rst step in applying dynamic estimation, the results for the bank market concentration measure remain qualitatively unaltered.
Conclusions
Credit constraints imposed by banks on …rms may hamper economic growth.
In this paper we examine whether or not changes in the market structure of European bank markets a¤ect the access of non-…nancial …rms to bank …nance.
More speci…cally, we investigate the relationship between the degree of concen- Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Estimation methods for specification (4) The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t} All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the firm level (Rogers standard errors) The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity. Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
HHI
Endogeneity results for specification (4) The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t} All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the firm level (Rogers standard errors) The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
All regressions are estimated using IV to instrument bank market structure Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robustness results for specification (4) The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t} The dependent variable is market leverage All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the firm level (Rogers standard errors) The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
